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FOR A FEW DOLLARS LESS: EXPLAINING STATE TO STATE




The limited liability company (LLC) is a much more popular business entity in
some U.S. states than in others. This empirical study provides the first detailed
analysis of this phenomenon.
Ifind that formationfees, rather than taxes or substantive rules or anything else,
explain the variation in LLC popularity best. Differentials between the fees for
organizing an LLC and thefeesfor organizing a corporation explain 17% to 28% of
the state-to-state variation in LLC popularity. These formation fee differentials are
not very big, but they are highly visible at the moment the business entity is formed.
In contrast, the data show no relationship between LLC popularity and diferentials
in annual fees and entity-level taxes. Diferences in substantive rules contained in
LLC statutes are likely to be trivial in the sense that they are not important enough to
affect entity choice. However, LLCs are more popular in those states whose LLC
statutes expressly uphold the principle of contractual freedom and thus reassure LLC
members that courts will not rewrite their contract in the event of a lawsuit. Finally,
Ifound no evidence that LLC popularity is related to different levels of uniformity of
LLC statutes, the age of LLC statutes, and otherfactors.
The Digital Object Identifier of the dataset compiled for this study is
doi:10.3886/ICPSR31561.
* Scholar in Residence, University of Virginia School of Law; Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law
School. I thank Professors Lynn M. LoPucki and Katherine M. Porter for their guidance throughout the
research and writing process, Professors Jens Dammann and Guhan Subramanian for their comments on
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Joshua Boehm, Kevin Caldwell, Mazen Elfakhani, Thomas Feniss, Sara Greene, Jason luliano, Ruth Lee,
Andrew Meiser, Jonathan Miller, Jared Rinehimer, David Simon and Gita Srivastava for their comments, and
my wife, Dr. Claudia F. Brithwiler Fausermann, for critically reviewing the paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Limited liability companies (LLCs) are a much more popular business
entity in some states than in others. For instance, people in Connecticut
form twelve times as many LLCs than corporations each year. In contrast,
more corporations than LLCs are still formed in Illinois, New York, and
California. This empirical study provides the first detailed analysis of the
state-to-state variation of LLC popularity, using a partly original set of
cross-sectional state-level data. In a nutshell, I find that formation fee
differentials explain more of the variation in LLC popularity than all other
factors taken together. Differentials in recurring fees and entity-level
taxes are unrelated to LLC popularity, and substantive rules contained in
LLC statutes are probably of trivial importance. However, LLCs are more
popular in those states whose LLC statute expressly endorses the principle
of contractual freedom.
Figure 1 illustrates how the popularity of the LLC varies across the 50
states and the District of Columbia. I measure LLC popularity in three
different ways. My first measurement is the ratio of new domestic LLCs
to new domestic business or professional corporations formed in the most
recent year available. The second measurement has a broader
denominator, which comprises all other domestic entities that provide for
limited liability, namely corporations, limited partnerships (LPs), limited
liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability limited partnerships
(LLLPs). The third measurement is different from the first in that its
denominator includes not only domestic corporations, but also
corporations from other states that have registered to do business in the
respective state. By all three measurements, the popularity of the LLC
varies substantially from state to state. The highest ratio of LLCs to
domestic corporations is 17.7 times higher than the lowest.' The highest
ratio of LLCs to other limited liability entities is 16.3 times higher than
the lowest,2 and the highest ratio of LLCs to corporations including out-
of-state corporations is still 11.6 times higher than the lowest.3
I Connecticut's ratio of LLCs to domestic corporations is 12.3, Illinois' is 0.70. 123 divided by 0.70
equals 17.7. See infra Figure 1.
2 Connecticut's ratio of LICs to other limited liability entities is 113, Illinois' is 0.69. 113 divided
by 0.69 equals 16.3. See infia Figure 1.
3 Wisconsin's respective ratio is 53, North Dakota's is 0.46. 53 divided by 0.46 equals 11.6. See infa
Figure 1.
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Source: Calculated from the International Association of Commercial Administrators' (IACA) Annual Reports of
Jurisdictions. Note: Corporations include business and professional corporations. 2009 data except for the follow-
ing states, for which more recent data are unavailable: WV (2008); AL, AZ, DC, MD, TN (2007); AK, OK, ND (2006);
SC (2005); NM (2004). The ratio of new LLCs to new domestic corporations, LPs, LLPs and LLLPs for AZ and VT
is unavailable.
The differences in popularity of the LLC have been remarkably
persistent over time. Figure 2 shows how LLC-to-corporations ratios (the
first of the three measurements introduced above) have changed across
the 50 states and D.C. between 1999 and 2009. In that period, the median
LLC-to-corporations ratio increased from 0.70 to 2.77. The gap between
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the state whose LLC-to-corporations ratio is at the lowest quartile4 and
the state whose LLC-to-corporations ratio is at the highest quartile has
widened correspondingly.s
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Source: Calculated from the International Association of Commercial
Administrators' (IACA) Annual Reports of Jurisdictions.
Note: Data from 2004 through 2009 represent the ratio of new LLCs
to new domestic corporations. Data from 1999 through 2003 repre-
sent the ratio of new LLCs to new domestic or out-of-state corpora-
tions. Number of jurisdictions reporting: 1999: n=40; 2000: n=47;
2001: n=47; 2002: n=50; 2003: n=48; 2004: n=46; 2005: n=50; 2006:
n=45; 2007: n=43; 2008: n=31; 2009: n=40.
The business entity of the LLC was designed to be popular. Forty-
nine jurisdictions enacted LLC laws between 1990 and 1997,6 and
I use quartiles and not the highest and lowest LLC-to-corporations ratios in Figure 2 because not
all states have reported data for each year and quartiles are less sensitive to missing values than the highest and
lowest values. A year-by-year comparison of the highest and the lowest values would have said more about
which states had not submitted a report than about the long-term trends in LLC-to-corporations ratios.
s This has mathematical reasons: If the median ratio is 1.0 and the first and third quartiles are 40%
below and above the median, the difference between the third and the first quartile is 0.8. If the median is 2.0
and the first and third quartiles are 40% below and above the median, the difference between the third and the
first quartile would be 1.6. See infra Figure 2.
6 For year-by-year figures see Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evlution and Spontaneous
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virtually all state legislatures wanted the LLC to be a business-friendly
entity that would attract business and revenue to the state.' Indeed, since
2004, when LLC formations surpassed incorporations for the first time,
the LLC is the most popular business entity in the United States.' The
numbers of LLC formations are impressive. From 2004 to 2007, the latest
period for which complete data are available, 4.9 million LLCs were
formed nationwide, compared to 3.3 million corporations and 0.2 million
limited partnerships.' However, as Figure 1 shows, the LLC is not
equally popular in all U.S. states.
In an empirical study from 2001, Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi
found that LLC-to-LLP ratios vary considerably across states.o They
explained this variation with differences in income taxation, among other
things." Professor Howard Friedman was the first to note that the
proportion of LLCs in the total number of business formations varies
widely from state to state.12 He examined the six states that had the lowest
percentage of LLCs to total business formations at the time, and he
surmised that this was due to fee and franchise tax differentials,
unfavorable state tax treatment and-in two cases-inaccurate reporting
Unifonity: Evidencefiom de Evolutiwn ofLimited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464,472-73(1996).
Professor Goforth summarized the motives for enacting LLC laws as follows: "In virtually every
state, those responsible for drafting and/or enacting LLC legislation cite motives which relate to attracting
business and revenue to the state.. . . In many instances, the speed with which LLC legislation has been
implemented is due at least in part to an express desire not to be left behind as neighboring or competing
jurisdictions authorized the new business form." Carol R Goforth, The Rie of the Limited Liability Company:
Evidence ofa Race Between the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L REv. 1193, 1272 (1995). For a detailed
overview of the legislative history of the LLC, see id. at 1222-62.
8 Compare Howard M. Friedman, The Silent LLC Reuoution-The Social Cost ofAcademic Neglect, 38
CREIGHTON L REv. 35, 37 (2004) (reporting that in 2003, 45% of business filings were for LLCs), with
Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New KIng of the Hill: An Empirical Study of dre Number of New LLCs,
Corporations, and LPs Formed in die United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years
2002-2006,15 FORDHAMJ. CORP. & FIN. L 459, 469 (2010) (reporting that in 2004, 52% of business filings
were for LLCs, 45% for corporations, and 3% for limited partnerships).
9 Chrisman, supra note 8, at 476.
1o See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Ghoice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 79, 121-27, 130-34 tbl.Z 138 tbl.4 (2001) (reporting LLC-to-LLP ratios for each state for the
years 1993 through 1999 and performing a regression analysis showing that LLC-to-LLP ratios are lower in
those states that tax LLCs adversely, in those four states that have a very long LLC statute, and in those states in
which LLP members are filly shielded from liability).
I Id.
12 See Friedman, supra note 8, at 37-39 (tabulating LLC formations as percentages of total business
formations in each state in 2002 and 2003 and finding that LLCs predominate in 29 states, while
incorporations double LLC formations in six states).
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of filing statistics." In 2006, Miller, Greenberg and Greenberg calculated
the LLC-to-corporations ratios of seven states and postulated that the
differences in their results were driven by some states' unfavorable
treatment of the LLC, such as cumbersome filing procedures and highly
regulated statutes.14
Closely related to this study is a strand of empirical literature on the
choices of formation state by closely held companies." Professors
Dammann and Schindeln studied the formation choices of LLCs with
twenty or more employees and found that these companies are more
likely to be formed outside the state of their primary place of business if
the state of their primary place of business does not allow LLC members
to trigger the dissolution of the company in case of oppression, or if it
does not shield LLCs from veil piercing for the mere failure to observe
formalities. 6 In a similar study, Professors Kobayashi and Ribstein found
little evidence that substantive law explains the formation choices of
LLCs, regardless of firm size." Instead, they found that LLCs are more
likely to be formed out of state if the state of their primary place of
business has a low court quality index." In a study of the incorporation
choices of closely held corporations, Dammann and Schiindeln found that
corporations with more than 1,000 employees are more likely to be
formed out of state if court quality in the state of their primary place of
business is low, the risk of veil piercing is high in that state, or if its
13 See id. at 55-58.
14 See Sandra K Miller, Penelope Sue Greenberg & Ralph H. Greenberg, An Empirical Glimpse into
Limited Liability Companies: Assessing the Need to Protet Minority Investors, 43 AM. Bus. LJ. 609, 620-21 (2006).
15 Generally, there is much more literature on the choice of formation state by closely held
companies than on the incorporation choices of public firms. As to the latter, see generally Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Finns' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46J. L & ECON. 383 (2003); Robert Daines, The
Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L REv. 1559 (2002); Stephen P. Ferris, Robert M. Lawless &
Gregory Noronha, The Inluence of State Lgl Entirnments on Firm Inorporation Decisions and Vahes, 2 J. L
ECON. & POL'Y 1 (2006); Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law Statutory Flbilityudicial Quali, or
Takeover Proteion? 22 J. L ECON. & ORG. 340 (2006); Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in
Neada? Self-Seleting into a Lax Law, 5TH ANN. CONF. ON EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. PAPER (March 27,2011),
available at httpV/ssrncorr/abstract= 1644974.
16 See Jens Dammann & Matthias Schindeln, Wh4er are Limited Liability Companies Formed? An
EmpiricalAnalsis, U. TEx SCH. L, L & ECON. RESEARCH PAPER No. 126; 5TH ANN. CONF. ON EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. PAPER (June 28,2010), http-/ssrn.condabstract= 1633472.
17 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry Jurisdictional Competition for
Limited Liabiity Companies, 2011 U. IL. L. REV. 91 (2011).
18 Id. at 137. As to the measurements ofcourt quality used by the authors, see id at 104.
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corporate statute has a high level of minority protection or permits
waivers of the duty of care."
To explore potential explanations of the state-to-state variation in
LLC popularity, I performed regression analyses of a partly original
dataset of cross-sectional state-level data on business formations in the
fifty United States and the District of Columbia. My findings are the
following:
I find that LLCs are more popular in those states in which the fees for
organizing an LLC are lower than the fees for organizing a corporation,
and less popular in those states in which the fees for organizing an LLC
are higher than the fees for organizing a corporation. 20 Formation fee
differentials, which are highly visible at the moment the business entity is
formed, account for 17% to 28% of the variation in LLC popularity.
Their explanatory power is greater than the explanatory power of all other
variables taken together.
Paradoxically, LLC popularity is not associated with differentials in
recurring fees (such as annual report fees) and franchise taxes, although
these differentials tend to be greater than the formation fee differentials.
Generally, the data show no connection between the variation in LLC
popularity and substantive provisions in LLC statutes that protect
minority LLC members or third parties, or define the fiduciary duties of
LLC members and managers.2 1 Likewise, the popularity of the LLC is
unrelated to the prevalence of particular mandatory rules and to the
content of select default rules that presumably suit the needs of small
companies. Only one out of the many substantive-law variables tested is
associated with LLC popularity, which is likely a random result. Thus,
substantive LLC law is likely to be trivial in the sense that state-to-state
differences in this respect are not important enough to affect entity
choice, given that the most important characteristics of the LLC are the
same in all states.
I also find that LLCs are more popular in those states whose statutes
expressly provide that "maximum effect" shall be given to the principle of
"freedom of contract."22 The respective variable is highly robust and
explains about 10% of the variation in LLC popularity. If this is not a
result by chance, it could be viewed as evidence that "freedom of contract"
19 Jens Dammann & Matthias SchUndeln, The Incorporation Chices ofPrivately Held onporations, 27 J.
L. ECON.& ORG. 79,106-07 (2011).
20 SeeinfraPart0.
21 See infra Part 0.
2 See infra Part0.
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provisions reassure firms that courts will not rewrite their LLC contracts
in case of a lawsuit.
Finally, the variation in LLC popularity cannot be explained by the
following factors: The degree to which LLC statutes are uniform;
whether a state has adopted the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(ULLCA) or the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(RULLCA); the age of LLC statutes; whether a state permits the
formation of series LLCs; and whether a state limits the rights of creditors
of LLC members to those of an assignee of the member's financial interest
in the company.u In addition, California is the only state to prohibit
LLCs from providing professional services. This might explain that state's
exceptionally low LLC-to-corporations ratio.24
I proceed as follows: In Part II, I explain the data and the
methodology. In Part III, I discuss my findings and their implications. In
Part IV, I discuss directions for future research. In Part V, I conclude the
paper.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To explain the variation in LLC popularity, I performed ordinary
least-square regressions using a partly original dataset of cross-sectional
state-level data with 51 observations (50 states plus D.C.). The dataset is
posted on the data repository of the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR).25
My dependent variables are based on the three measurements of LLC
popularity introduced at the beginning of this study.26 I use three
different dependent variables as a robustness check because there is no
single correct measurement for the popularity of LLCs. All three
dependent variables are calculated the same way, though with different
denominators. The first dependent variable, LLCs over Domestic
Corporations, is the ratio of new domestic LLCs to new domestic business
or professional corporations, divided by the median of that ratio among all
states in the same year, logged.2 ' LLCs over Domestic Corporations is no less
See infra Part 0.
24 See infra Part 0.
2 Daniel M. HIusermann, State-Leel Data on Limited Liability Companie; (L), United States, 2004-
2009, INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POL & Soc. RES. (Jun. 27, 2011), http;//dxdoi.org/103886'
ICPSR31561.v1.
2 See supra p. 3.
7 The formula for calculating the dependent variables is:
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a measurement of the popularity of domestic corporations than of LLCs.
This is a problem because the popularity of corporations may vary as
widely as the popularity of the LLC. The second dependent variable,
LLCs over Domestic Entities, therefore uses a broader denominator, namely
the sum of new domestic business or professional corporations, LPs,
LLPs, and LLLPs. Including LPs, LLPs, and LLLPs broadens the
denominator only to a small extent, as comparatively few of these
partnerships are formed (see above Figure 1). The third dependent
variable, LLCs over Domestic and Foreign Corporations, uses yet another
denominator, namely the sum of new domestic and out-of-state business
or professional corporations. This measurement of LLC popularity yields
much lower ratios than the first one (see above Figure 1). It is imperfect as
well because it counts those corporations that register to do business in
another state at least twice: If a corporation is formed in state A and
registers to do business in state B (where it may have its headquarter) as
well as in state C, it is counted towards LLCs over Domestic and Foreign
Corporations for all three states. 'When viewed together, the three
dependent variables give a fairly accurate picture of the state-to-state
variation in LLC popularity.
I took the data for the dependent variables from annual filing statistics
that state filing offices report to the International Association of
Commercial Administrators (IACA) on standardized forms. The IACA
compiles these data and publishes them online as IACA Annual Reports
of Jurisdictions.2 8 Not all filing offices submit a report every year, and
there are some inconsistencies and errors in the data as well.29  I
complemented the IACA data and corrected errors, to the extent possible,
DV, =[n( -.
median(R,)
whereas DV is the value of the dependent variable, i is the state for which the value of the dependent variable is
calculated, R is the measurement of LLC popularity used, and y is the year of observation. It was necessary to
log the dependent variables to render the regression residuals normal.
2 Annual Jurisdicional Reponrs, INT'L ASs'N COM. ADMINS. (May 12, 2011, 4:30 PM),
httpV/wwwiaca.orgnode0 (compilation of reports from 2002 onwards). The IACA reports for 1999 to 2001
are a courtesy of Professor MarkJ. Roe and are on file with the author.
2 See supra note 28. For instance, filing offices sometimes reported the total number of entities on
file instead of yearly filings. These errors can be detected because of their magnitude. Additionally, some
jurisdictions include nonprofit corporations in their filing statistic for business and professional corporations.
These cases are flagged in the reports. They affect the dependent variables only marginally because these data
were only used to calculate the denominator of the dependent variables, median(Ry). See supra note 27. None
of the data used to calculate the numerator of the dependent variables, Riy, see supra note 27, included
nonprofit corporations. See supra note 28.
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by filing statistics published by the individual filing offices on their
websites.o Until 2006, filing offices reported their data to the IACA
twice: once as of the actual report year, and a year later as previous year
data. This allowed me to detect discrepancies between the data for a given
year. These discrepancies were mostly marginal and may be due to
revisions of filing data by the filing office. The data used to calculate the
dependent variables may contain some modest errors, but these data are
the most accurate and complete data compiled to date.
Since not all filing offices submit a report every year, I used data from
the most recent year available. For 40 states, that year was 2009. The data
for West Virginia are from 2008; data for Alabama, Arizona, D.C.,
Maryland, and Tennessee are from 2007; data for Alaska, Oklahoma, and
North Dakota are from 2006; data for South Carolina are from 2005; data
for New Mexico are from 2004. From 2004 to 2009, the median ratio of
new LLCs to new corporations (and other limited liability entities) has
increased from 1.77 to 2.77. I corrected this overall increase in LLC
popularity by dividing the three measurements of LLC popularity by their
median in the relevant year of observation. Otherwise, the popularity of
LLCs in states with older data would have been understated.
I describe the independent variables and their sources at appropriate
places in Part 0 of this study. Many of these variables were coded by
Dammann and Schiindeln or Kobayashi and Ribstein, who published the
data in the appendices of their studies on out-of-state formations of
LLCs.3 ' Dammann and Schuindeln coded their variables as of January 1,
2007.32 The reference date of Kobayashi and Ribstein's study, whose
original version dates from July 9, 2009,' is unknown. There are some
30 Select states publish filing statistics on their respective Secretary of State websites at least for some
years. See Corporate Entities Formed By Year, GEORGIA SECRETARY OF STATE, httpV/sos.ga.gov/cgi-
bir/EntitiesFomedByYear.asp (last updated Nov. 9, 2011); New Business Entity Filings by Year, IDAHO
SECRETARYOF STATE, http//www.sos.idahogov/corplbests.htmi (last visited Dec. 24, 2011); Annual Business
Filing Stadtirw, KENTUCKY SECRETARY OF STATE, httpV/apps.sos.ky.govbusiness/businessflingstatistics/
(updated nightly); Filing Statistics, NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, (2010),
http/nvsos.gorvfndex.aspxpage=147; Business Entity Statistics: Seven Biennial Histori, STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, httpV/www.nd.gov/sor/pdstatisticalhistorybieniums-
20070806.pdf, Corporation Statists, TENNESSEE SECRETARY OF STATE, (2010),
httpVAvww.state.trus/sos/bus_svc/busstats.htm; Statistics, UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND
COMMERCIAL CODE, (2011), httpV/corporations.utahgv/servics/statistics.html; New Business Start-Ups,
VERMONT SECRETARYOF STATE, (Aug, 2011), httpV/wwwsecstate.vt.us/corpWdobi2/stats.htm.
31 See Dammann & Schtindeln, supra note 16, app. at 37-40; Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17,
app. at 138-43.
32 Damrnmann & Schiindeln, supra note 16, at 7.
33 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribsteinjurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies
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discrepancies between these variables and the law that was in force in the
year of observation of my dependent variables (i.e., mostly 2009), which I
took as a reference date. Notably, Idaho and Iowa revised their LLC
statutes in 2008,34 and other states may have amended relevant parts of
their statutes over the last years as well. I therefore checked and updated
those variables that were statistically significant and robust in the
regression analyses." Of those variables that I coded myself based on state
statutes, the reference date is June 30 of the dependent variables' year of
observation.
A word is warranted here about the number of variables and the
construction of the regression models. A study of the relationship
between the popularity of the LLC and state law faces the problem that
there is a large number of substantive rules that could theoretically explain
the state-to-state variation in LLC popularity, yet there is no a priori
criterion to determine which of these rules are relevant and which are not.
For example, we can only guess which rule is more important to business
organizers, one that requires a unanimous vote to dissolve the LLC, or
one that gives minority LLC members a right to withdraw from the
company. To deal with this issue, I took a two-pronged approach.
First, I tested a large number of individual variables, selected those
that were statistically significant, and included them in a model that
explains the dependent variables best. (Because the dataset comprises
only 51 observations, I could not test more than six independent variables
in a single model.") Using this approach, the likelihood of obtaining
results that are statistically significant by chance is substantial because of
the large number of variables tested. I tested 24 individual variables in my
study." As Table 1 shows, if the 24 variables were random variables, the
likelihood of finding one or more variables statistically significant by
chance is quite high.
(U. Ill L & Econ. Research Paper No. LE09-017, July 9,2009); compare widt Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note
17.
3 Idaho and Iowa adopted the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA) in
2008. See IDAHO CODE ANN. 55 30-6-101 to -1104 (2011); IOWA CODE S5 489.101-.1304.
3s See infra notes 39-40, 63-66 and 117-119 (discussing these variables known as "Freedom of
Contracts" and "Default Withdrawal Right" as well as their coding details).
36 With a larger number of independent variables, the degrees of freedom for error would have been
too low for the statistical tests to be powerful. For additional information pertaining to this topic, see
httpV/ordinatiorLokstate.edu/MULTIPLE.htm.
3 See infra Table 1. Note that the table does not include alternative codings and index variables that
compound several of the independent variables tested.
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Table 1: Likelihood of finding significance with 24 random
variables
Level of significance chosen:
p-0.10 p=0.05 p-0.01 p-0.001
>1 92% 71% 21.4% 2.4%
Nurofsignificant 2 71% 34% 2.4% <0.1%
a3 44% 12% 02% <0.1%
Example: There is a 92% chance that at least one out of 24 random variables will be significant at a 0.10
level
Source: Calculated using the calculator for binomial distributions B(24, p) on StatTrek.com,
http/stattrek.comffables/Binomial.aspx.
As a second prong, I combined related variables to indices, which I
describe at appropriate places in Part 0 of this study. The intuition behind
this method is that a large number of favorable (or unfavorable)
substantive-law provisions are more likely to affect LLC popularity than a
single provision. When an index was statistically significant, I tested its
components individually in order to see whether one of them drives the
results alone. For that reason, the use of indices cannot avoid the problem
of obtaining results that are significant by chance.
M. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
My most important finding is that it is formation fees, not taxes or
substantive rules or anything else, that explain the variation in LLC
popularity best. Table 2 presents a selection of regression models in
which one or more independent variables were statistically significant. All
models in Table 2 use the first dependent variable, LLCs over Domestic
Corporations. Model (5) explains the variation in LLC popularity best.
Models (1) to (4) and (6) are variations of that model.
The values of the variable "Formation fee differential ('low scenario')"
equal the formation fee for an LLC minus the formation fee for a business
corporation if the entity has paid-in equity of $10,000 or less." This
variable is negatively correlated with LLCs over Domestic Corporations, and it
was highly significant (with p<0.001) in all models tested. Hence, LLCs
tend to be more popular in those states in which it is cheaper to form an
LLC than a corporation and less popular in those states in which it is more
38 See infa notes 53-56 and acompanying text (providing coding details and alternative codings for
"medium" and "high" scenarios).
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expensive to form an LLC than a corporation. I will discuss this finding
in Part 0.
Table 2: Regression Results
Dependent variable: LLCs over Domestic Corporations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Filing fee differential -0.0026*** -0.0027*** -0.0030*** -0.0030*** -0.0028*** -0.0028***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001
Statute contains 0.3292* 0.3221* 0.4172** 0.4233**
"freedom of contract" (0.1344) (0.1252) (0.1314) (0.1333)
provision p= 0 .0 19  p=0.013 p=0.003 p=0.003
Member has default 0.3985** 0.3379* 0.3734** 0.3632*
right to withdraw from (0.1380) (0.1501) (0.1348) (0.1380)
LLC p=0.006 p=0.029 p=0.008 p=0.012
Unanimous vote 0.2014 0.1573 0.3004t 0.31691
required for transfer of (0.1636) (0.1581) (0.1559) (0.1617)
management p=0.224 p=0.3 2 5 p=0.060 p=0.056
Modifications of agency 0.2822* 0.2047
powers in articles of (0.1350) (0.1340)
organization p=0.042 p=O.134
Proportion of firms in -0.9026
real estate and (2.038)
professional services p=0 .6 6 0
sectors
0.0684 -0.0280 -0.0703 -0.0894 -0.2879t -0.1682
Constant (0.0859) (0.0867) (0.1592) (0.1530) (0.1591) (0.3145)
p=0.430 p=0.748 p=0.661 p=0.562 p=0.077 p=0.59 5
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.43 0.32 0.37 0.46 0.45
Root M.S.E. 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.42
tp:O.10, *pSO.05, **pS0.01, ***p50.001. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Note: The observations include all 50 states plus D.C. The dependent variable is the ratio of
new LLCs and new domestic business or professional corporations, divided by the median ratio
in the respective year of observation, logged.
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The variable "Statute contains 'freedom of contract' provision" (in
short: Freedom of Contract) is a dummy variable coded by Dammann and
Schiindeln," which takes the value one for those 19 states whose LLC
statute expressly provides that it is the statute's policy-or that the statute
has to be construed-to give "maximum effect" to the principle of
"freedom of contract," and zero for all other states. The variable is
positively correlated with the dependent variable, and it was significant at
p:0.01 or p50.05 in all models tested. This means that LLCs are more
popular in those states that have a "freedom of contract" provision than in
those that do not. I will discuss this result in Part 0.
The variable "Member has default right to withdraw from LLC" (in
short: Default Withdrawal Right) is the inverse of a dummy variable coded
by Dammann and Schindeln." It takes the value one for those 13 states
in which an LLC member has a right to exit the company with or without
notice and to be paid the value of the membership interest, unless the
parties have agreed otherwise. The variable is positively correlated with
the dependent variable, and it was significant with pS0.01 or p50.05 in
all models tested. In other words, LLCs are more popular in those states
in which LLC members have a right to withdraw from the company, if
the parties have not agreed otherwise. I will discuss this finding in Part 0.
The variable "Unanimous vote required for transfer of management"
(in short: Unanimous Management Transfer) is a dummy variable that I
coded,4 1 which takes the value one for those 40 states in which an LLC
may only transfer the right to manage the company with the consent of all
of its members, and zero for all other states. The variable is positively
correlated with the dependent variable and marginally significant
(p50.10) in models (5) and (6), but it is not significant in models that do
not include the Freedom of Contract variable, such as models (3) and (4) in
Table 2).42 I will discuss this result in Part 0.
The variable "Modifications of agency powers in articles of
organization" (in short: Agency Powers Modifications) is a dummy variable
that I coded, 3 which takes the value one for those 21 states in which the
3 Dammann & Schindeln, supra note 16, at 14, 40 (naming the variable "Freedom").
4 Id. at 9-10, app. at 37, 41-43 (naming the variable "Withdrawal"); For coding details see infra p. 26
and notes 63-66.
4 See 1 IARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KFATINGE ON LIMIrED
LIABunY COMPANIES 5 7:7 (2011), available at Westlaw RKLLC (exubiting that the variable is based on a
synoptical table ofstate-law provisions concerning the transfer ofmanagement rights compiled herein).
42 Although not reported in Table 2, the variable is significant in other models provided that they
include the Freadom ofContraa variable.
4 The variable is based on a synoptical table of state-law provisions concerning agency powers
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powers to bind the company that LLC members have by statutory default
may only be changed in the articles of organization, and zero for all other
states. The variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable
and significant (p50.05) in model (3), but not in model (4). I will discuss
this finding in Part 0.
The values of the last variable reported in Table 2, "Proportion of
firms in real estate and professional services sectors," equal the number of
firms in the real estate sector plus the number of firms in the professional
services sector (NAICS sectors 53 & 54)," all divided by the total number
of firms in a particular state.45  The variable serves as a control variable
because there are reasons to believe that the LLC form is particularly
attractive to businesses in these two sectors for tax reasons.4 However,
the variable was not statistically significant in any of the models tested,
and it did not affect the coefficients and the standard errors of the other
variables to a notable extent.
I also tested models that use the two alternative dependent variables,
LLCs over Domestic Entities and LLCs over Domestic and Foreign Corporations.
The predictive power of these models, as measured by their R-squared
values, is slightly lower than the predictive power of the models reported
in Table 2, which use LLCs over Domestic Corporations as dependent
variable. Hence, the predictive power of the variables reported in Table 2
does not depend greatly on how the popularity of LLCs is measured.
In the following sections, I discuss the findings reported in Table 2 as
well as my other findings and their implications.
compiled by Ribstein and Keatinge. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, app. 8-3.
4 NAICS is the North American Industry Classification System. See North American Industry
Classification System, Introduction, U.S. CENsus BuRFAu, http/www.census.gov/eoswww/naics/.
45 I calculated the values based on the 2002 Economic Census. 2002 Fonomic Census, Sector 00: All
sectors: Core Business Statistics Seres: Comparative Statistics for die United States and the States (1997 NAICS Basis):
2002 and 1997, U.S. CENsus BuRFAu (July 17, 2006), available at httpV/factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
IBQTable?_bm=y&-geo id=D&-ds name=ECO200CCOMP1&-_lang=en. More recent data are
unavailable.
4 The reason is that these businesses may elect to be taxed as partnerships if they are organized as an
LLC. If they are organized as a corporation, they may only elect to be taxed as S or C corporations.
Partnership taxation is considered particularly attractive for these firms. For a detailed analysis see John W.
Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of die Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey die Stars Might Lie But the Numbers
Never Do," 78 TEX L REv. 885, 889-90,895, 922-24 (2000); see also Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 10, at 99-
100.
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A. The Fee Paradox
Business entities cost money. These costs comprise, among other
things, the fees for organizing the entity and keeping it active, and entity-
level taxes that only business entities (but not individuals or sole
proprietorships) have to pay. To test whether fee and tax differentials
explain some of the variation in LLC popularity, I created two types of
variables, Formation Fee Differential and Periodic Cost Differential. As the fee
and tax burden sometimes depends on the size of a company, I calculated
fee and cost differentials for three hypothetical companies of different
sizes, resulting in a total of six fee and tax-related variables. The variables
are my own calculations based on state statutes and fee schedules.
The values of the first type of variable, Formation Fee Differential, equal
the fee for filing articles of organization of an LLC minus the fee for filing
articles of incorporation of a business corporation. The values exclude
recording fees as well as fees for the reservation of a company name and
the registration of an agent because there is little transparency about
whether business organizers can avoid these fees or not. The value for
New York takes into account conservatively estimated costs of $500 for
publishing a notice of LLC formation, which is a mandatory requirement
in that state.47
The values of the second type of variable, Periodic Cost Diferential,
equal the periodic fees and state entity-level taxes that an LLC has to pay
every year minus the periodic fees and taxes that a business corporation
has to pay each year. The values include annual or biennial report fees,
other annual fees (e.g. renewal fees), state franchise taxes and any other
state entity-level taxes, but exclude taxes on nonresident LLC members.
Annual report fees are flat rates in all but three states, in which they are
based on the paid-in capital (South Dakota and Wyoming) or the number
of members (Tennessee).48 Those states that impose an income tax on
4 The state of New York requires newly formed LLCs, but not corporations, to publish a notice of
formation six times in two newspapers. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW S 206 (McKinney 2011). Publication cost
estimates range from $200 to $2,500, depending on the place and newspaper. See Blumberg Excelsior, New
York LLC Formation Online, http/Avww.blankrupter.con/bio/nyllcintro.aspx According to a local small
business law firm, publication costs range from $700 to $1,000 in New York City and from $295 to $1,250
elsewhere. See Brodsky Law Firm PLLC, LLC Publication, httpV/www.11cpublication.net/. In addition, the
state imposes a $50 fee on the filing of a certificate of publication. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW S 1101(s)
(McKinney 2011). This fee is also included in the variable.
48 See S.D. CODIFIED IAWS S 47-34A-212(a), (c) (2011); Wis. STAT. S 17-15-132(a) (repealed 2010);
TENN. CODE ANN. S 48-249-1007(d), (e) (2011); For an overview of the filing fees and methods of
computation, see Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theomy ofConlraciity and Legl
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business entities treat LLCs and corporations equally because they
recognize the election that businesses make for federal income tax
purposes under the "check-the-box" regulations of 1997.49 Those states
that impose franchise taxes on LLCs and corporations base these taxes on
receipts, net income, assets, equity, or the par value of stocks.so
As mentioned, I calculated the formation fee and periodic cost
differentials for three different scenarios. I defined these scenarios based
on the IRS tax statistics in a way that the scenarios cover the range in
which the median firm is likely to be found." The "low" scenario is a
company with domestic receipts of $25,000 per year, zero net income,
assets of $50,000, paid-in equity of $10,000, and minimal par value of its
certificates.5 2 The "medium" company has domestic receipts of $150,000
per year, a gross income below $100,000, $5,000 net income, assets of
$100,000, $20,000 in paid-in equity, and minimal par value. The "high"
scenario is a company with $1,000,000 of domestic receipts, $250,000
gross income, $20,000 net income, $250,000 of assets, $100,000 of paid-in
equity, and a par value of $100.
The formation fee differentials are identical in all three scenarios in 46
states. In three additional states, the scenarios differ by less than $50 as
seen in Table 3.53 Table 3 sets out the formation fees and formation fee
differentials for the "low" scenario.
Indeterninacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, app. at 261-66 (2011).
4 Treas. Reg. SS 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 1996). Under the "check-the-box" regulations, an
LLC can elect to be treated for federal tax purposes as a C corporation, an S corporation, a partnership, or a
sole proprietorship, respectively. See id A corporation can choose to be treated as a C or S corporation, but
not as a partnership or sole proprietorship. See id. For an overview of state income tax classifications, see
DAVIDJ. CARTANO, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF LIMiTED LIABaIY COMPANIEs 111 512 and 2301
(2010 ed.).
5 For an overview, see Manesh, supra note 48, app. at 263-66.
s1 From 2004 to 2009, the receipts of the median entity taxed as a S or C corporation were in the
$100,000 to $250,000 bracket The average net income of entities in this bracket was $6,600 in 2003 and
median assets were below $100,000 in 2000. For entities taxed as partnerships, median receipts were below
$25,000 from 2004 to 2009. The average net income for those entities was negative in 2003 and the median
entity's assets were between $100,000 and $250,000 in 2000. See IRS, SOI Bulletin Historical Table 12: Number
of Business Income Tax Returns, by Size of Business for Income Years, 1990-2008 Expanded, http/wwwv.is.gov/
taxstatsfarticle/0,,id=175843,00.html (last reviewed Apr. 13, 2011); see also IRS, SOI Tax Stats - Integrated
Business Data, Table 2: Number ofBusinesses, Business Reaipts, Net Income, Def 4 and Other Selected Items, by Forn of
Business, Industry, and Business Rezipt Size, Tar Year 2003, httpV/www.irs.gov/taxstatr/bustaxstats/article/
0,,id= 152029,00.html (last updatedJan. 27,2010).
52 For the calculation of filing fees, only the amount of paid-in capital is relevant to the definition of
the "low" scenario because all states either charge flat-rate filing fees or base them on the paid-in capital.
53 The three scenarios yield different filing fee differentials for the following states:
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Table 3: Formation Fees ("low" scenario)
LLC Corp.

















































































































































































































Source: Calculated from state statutes and fee schedules. 2009 data except for the
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Note: The formation fees are for LLCs and business corporations with authorized
capital of $10,000. Values exclude recording, name reservation, and agent registration
fees. The value for New York LLCs includes estimated publication costs of $500.
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, formation fees for LLCs and
corporations differ by less than $100, and in twenty-one of them there is
no differential at all. In contrast, LLC formation fees are substantially
higher than corporate formation fees in New York (whose values include,
as mentioned, estimated publication costs of $500), Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Tennessee.
Table 4 sets out the periodic fees and franchise tax differentials for the
three scenarios. The differentials are smaller than $100 in most states and
zero in 19 to 23 states, depending on the scenario. In some states,
however, the differentials are substantial, reaching up to $2,000.
Table 4: Periodic Fees and Franchise Tax Differentials
Annual fees and franchise taxes for an LLC
minus annual fees and franchise taxes for a corporation, dollar amounts
"med.










































































































































































Oklahoma 0 0 0 New Mexico -75 -75 -75
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 Florida -100 -100 -100
Rhode Island 0 0 0 D.C. -300 -300 -300
South Dakota 0 0 0 New Jersey -500 -750 -2,000
Texas 0 0 0
Source: Calculated from state statutes and fee schedules. 2009 data except for the following
states: WV (2008); AL, AZ, DC, MD (2007); AK, OK, ND (2006); SC (2005); NM (2004).
Note: For a description of the "low, "medium," and "high" scenarios see supra text
accompanying note 52. Rounded to the nearest dollar.
The data in Table 3 and Table 4 reveal an interesting pattern. For
instance, in the "low" scenario, LLC formation fees are higher than
corporate formation fees in 22 states and lower in 8 states. Annual fees
and taxes, however, are higher for LLCs than for corporations in 8 states
and lower in 20 states. Hence, on average, LLCs tend to be more
expensive to form than corporations, but cheaper to be kept active.
As mentioned, the Formation Fee Dffferential variable in the "low"
scenario is negatively correlated with LLC popularity and was highly
significant, with p<0.001, in all models tested.54 The coefficients were
similar with p<0.001 as well when I used the two alternative dependent
variables, LLCs over Domestic Entities and LLCs over Domestic and Foreign
Corporations, and the "medium" and "high" scenarios. Depending on the
firm-size scenario and the dependent variable used, formation fee
differentials explain between 17% and 28% of the variation in LLC
popularity.ss
In contrast to the formation fee differentials, the Periodic Cost
Differential variable tested insignificant in all models, regardless of the
firm-size scenario and the dependent variable used. Hence, differences
between LLCs and corporations in terms of periodic fees and franchise
taxes do not explain the variation in LLC popularity. This result is
surprising: Given that the formation fee differentials do explain the
variation, one might expect periodic fee and tax differentials to explain
some of the variation in LLC popularity as well-all the more because of
the recurring nature of these duties. A potential explanation of this result
is that the founders of LLCs and corporations are aware of the fees due at
5 See supra tbl.2.
ss Models with FRing Fee Diferenda as the sole independent variable have adjusted R-squared values
between 0.17 and 0.28. The model that uses LLCs over Domesc Coporations as a dependent variable and the
"low" scenario has an R-squared value of0.28. The model that uses LLC oer Domesc and Forngn Corporatom
as a dependent variable and the "high" scenario has an R-squared value of 0.17. The R-squared values of the
other models are in between. See id.
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the formation of the entity, but not of the periodic fees and franchise
taxes, when they choose between an LLC and a corporation. Since it is
impossible to test hypotheses as to the behavior of individuals in a study
that uses state-level data," further study is needed in this regard.
My results concerning fee and tax differentials answer the question
that Friedman left open in his 2004 study, namely "whether such
differentials are sufficiently important to deter use of LLCs."" Formation
fees-and New York's publication costs, which are included in my
variable--explain a sizeable portion of the variation in LLC popularity,
while periodic fees and franchise taxes explain none of it. Moreover, in
contrast to Ribstein and Kobayashi's 2001 study that compared LLCs with
LLPs," I found no relevant state-to-state variation in income tax
treatment between the LLC and the corporation." Thus, the variation in
LLC popularity cannot be explained by the states' different tax treatments
of LLCs.
B. The Dubious Significance of Substantive Rules
In addition to the substantive-law variables reported in the regression
table (supra Table 2), I tested a large number of other variables relating to
substantive provisions found in LLC statutes. I report my findings in
groups of variables starting with minority protection, followed by third-
party protection, fiduciary duties, mandatory provisions, and small-
business default rules.
1. Minority Protection
I tested four variables that are related to the protection of LLC
members who hold a minority interest in the company, namely Default
Withdrawal Right and Unanimous Management Transfer, both of which I
described above,6 as well as Unanimous Dissolution and Oppression Statute.
The latter two are the inverse of variables coded by Dammann &
% This would constitute an ecological fallacy. See generally W. S. Robinson, Ecologica Condations and
de Behavior ofIndividuals, 15 AM. Soc. REV. 351 (1950).
57 Friedman, supra note 8, at 58.
8 See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 10, at 122-23, app. at 138, 140 (using regression analysis
finding that the LLC-to-LLP ratio was significantly lower in those states which treated LLCs adversely
compared to LLPs in terms of income tax).
s9 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
6 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41, respectively.
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Schiindeln." Unanimous Dissolution takes the value one for those 36 states
whose LLC statute requires that a resolution to dissolve an LLC be
unanimous, and zero for all other states. Oppression Statute takes the value
one for those 19 states in which LLC members have a right to trigger the
dissolution of the company in case of oppression, unfairness or on
equitable grounds, and zero for all other states. I also combined the
minority protection variables in a Minority Protection Index. The index
values equal the arithmetic mean of the values of these four variables and
can thus take the values zero, 4, 2, , and one. The higher the index, the
higher is the level of minority protection.
The coding of the Default Withdrawal Right variable warrants
discussion. As mentioned, the variable is based on a dummy variable
coded by Dammann and Schundeln, who defined a withdrawal right for
the purpose of their variable as an express rule (or set of rules) pursuant to
which "(a) the member has the right to cease her membership by
voluntary unilateral declaration, either immediately or after giving notice,
(b) the company then has to pay the member the value of her
membership interest either immediately or within a reasonable or
otherwise limited period of time, and (c) the remaining members cannot
prevent the withdrawing member from obtaining the value of her
membership."6 2  Kobayashi and Ribstein coded seven states differently
according to their reading of the statutes,' but did not disclose what their
readings were. Dammann and Schiindeln's coding corresponds to my
reading of the seven disputed provisions." Accordingly, I used their
coding. However, I adjusted the values for Idaho and Iowa, which had
revised their statutes in 2008.65
61 See Dammann & Schandeln, supra note 16, at 10-11, app. at 38, 43-44 (naming the variable
"Dissolution One"); see also id. at 8-9, app. at 37 (naming the variable "Oppression One").
6 Id. at 10. Conversely, it does not matter for the definition whether the withdrawal leads to a
dissolution of the company or not, id., whether the right is called withdrawal, resignation or dissociation, id
app. at 41, or whether the withdrawing member has to give notice a certain period in advance. Id. On the
other hand, a formal right to withdraw does not fall within the definition if the withdrawing member will not
be paid until the time he would be paid had he not withdrawn. See id. For further coding details, see id. app. at
41-43, 52-54.
6 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 132-33, app. at 140-41 (naming the variable
"Withdraw").
6 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 29-707 (2011); IOWA CODE 5 490A.705, .805 (repealed 2008) Mo.
REV. STAT. 5 347.121(1), .103(2) (2011); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN SS 42:2B-38, 39 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
55 10-32-30(4), -109(1) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED IAWS 5 47-34A-603(b) (2011); WIAo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
123 (repealed 2010).
65 Dammann and Schindeln's reference date was January 1, 2007. Dammann & Schiindeln, supra
note 16, at 7. Idaho and Iowa adopted the RULLCA in 2008. Sae supra note 34. Under the RULLCA, a
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The regression results in Table 2 show that LLCs are more popular in
those states whose LLC statutes allow members to withdraw from the
company, unless they have agreed otherwise. This result is robust to
different model specifications. The Default Withdrawal Right variable is
significant at the levels ofp50.01 or p:50.05 in models that use LLCs over
Domestic Corporations and LLCs over Domestic Entities as dependent
variables. With LLCs over Domestic or Foreign Corporations as the dependent
variable, Default Withdrawal Right is significant at levels between p!50.01
and p!0.10.
As can be seen in Table 2, Unanimous Management Transfer-the
variable that indicates whether the right to manage the company may only
be transferred with the consent of all LLC members"-is only marginally
significant (with p50.10) in some of the models, and insignificant in
those models that do not include the Freedom of Contract variable. With the
two alternative dependent variables, LLCs over Domestic Entities and LLCs
over Domestic or Foreign Corporations, the significance of Unanimous
Management Transfer is above the p=0.10 threshold in most models. Due
to their lack of robustness, the results concerning the Unanimous
Management Transfer variable should be treated as negative findings. The
other two dummy variables, Unanimous Dissolution and Oppression Statute,
were not statistically significant in any of the models tested.
The Minority Protection Index is positively correlated with the
popularity of the LLC, but it was only marginally significant (with
p50.10) in some models and insignificant in others. These results,
however, are driven by the Default Withdrawal Right variable. When this
variable is excluded from the index, the index loses its significance. Thus,
the data do not show that the level of minority protection, as a collection
of rights, explains the variation in LLC popularity.
Given the large number of variables that I tested, I cannot rule out
that the significance of the Default Withdrawal Rights variable is the result of
chance.67 Moreover, it is difficult to find a theoretical reason as to why,
among all minority protection variables, Default Withdrawal Rights should
be associated with LLC popularity. Nevertheless, my results are
consistent with Dammann and Schiindeln's finding that the LLCs in their
sample were more likely to be formed in the state of their primary place of
member's withdrawal is wrongful by default. See IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 30-6-601(2)(b)(i) (2011); IOWA
CODE S 489.601(2)(b) (i) (2011).
6 See supra text accompanying note 41.
67 See supra text accompanying note 37 and Table 1.
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business if LLC members have a withdrawal right by default in that state.'
Their finding, however, was not significant in most of the models
reported.' Dammann and Schiindeln had expected a different outcome,
namely that companies would avoid default withdrawal rights, for two
reasons. First, a withdrawal may threaten the company's going concern
value if the company has to liquidate assets to pay off the withdrawing
member.o Second, a statutory withdrawal right may have adverse tax
consequences with regard to membership interests in family firms, even if
the parties waive their right to withdraw contractually." My findings add
to the evidence found by Dammann and Schuindeln that there is no
indication that companies avoid default withdrawal rights.
My negative findings concerning the Oppression Statute variable72
qualifies Dammann and Schuindeln's finding that LLCs are more likely to
be formed out of state if the state of their primary place of business has
not enacted an oppression statute.' Their result may be coincidental. It
is also to be noted that my study is the third study in which the Unanimous
Dissolution variable was not statistically significant.74
To sum up, the only variable that is significant is Default Withdrawal
Right, but that result is difficult to interpret. The other three minority
protection variables are either not significant at all (Oppression Statute and
Unanimous Dissolution) or only marginally significant (Unanimous
Management Transfer). Thus, minority protection rules do not explain the
variation in LLC popularity in a satisfactory way. In other words, whether
a state statute offers minority LLC members strong or weak protections
does not say much about the popularity of the LLC form in that state.
6 See Daimann & Schindeln, supra note 16, at 16 tbl.2, 21 tbl3, 22 tbl.4, 24 tbl.5.
69 See id. Kobayashi and Ribstein did not find significance with their revised variable. See Kobayashi
& Ribstein, supra note 17, at 120 tbl3A, 122 tbl.3B, 124 tbl.3C, 127 tbl.4. This result is hard to interpret as
their coding criteria are unknown. See supra text accompanying note 63.
70 See Dammann & Schindeln, supra note 16, at 17 (stating that an LLC may be forced into
liquidation when it has to pay out a withdrawing member).
71 Id. at 18 (stating that a withdrawal right may render membership interests in family firms ineligible
for the so-called marketability discount in valuing their membership interest for gift and estate tax purposes
because S 2704(b) of the Internal Revenue Code allows contractual restrictions on the right to liquidate the
membership interest to be ignored).
72 See supra note 61.
7 Dammann & Schiindeln, supra note 16, at 16 thL2, 17.
7 Cf id. at 16 tbl2; Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 120 thl3A, 122 tbL3B, 124 tbL3C, 127
thl.4.
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2. Third-Party Protection
I tested three dummy variables that encode statutory provisions aimed
at protecting third parties who deal with an LLC, namely Agency Powers
Modifications, Veil Piercing, and Member Disclosure. As explained, Agency
Powers Modifications takes the value one if the power of LLC members to
bind the company may only be changed in the articles of organization, and
zero in all other cases." Since the articles of organization are public
documents, such a rule creates transparency about who has the power to
act on behalf of the LLC, and who has not. Thus, the rule protects third
parties. The variable Veil Piercing is the inverse of a variable coded by
Dammann and Schindeln." It takes the value zero for those 36 states
whose LLC statute explicitly shields LLCs from veil piercing in case of a
failure to observe formalities, and one for all other states. Such a rule may
adversely affect third-parties, as it limits creditors' ability to have the "LLC
veil" pierced.' The variable Member Disclosure7 takes the value one for
those 23 states that require member-managed LLCs to disclose publicly
the identity of their organizers or their members, and zero for all other
states. Public disclosure of the identity of LLC organizers or members
may make it easier for creditors who believe that they have a personal
claim against one of these persons to learn that person's identity.
I also combined the three dummy variables described above in a
Third-Party Protection Index. The variable is the arithmetic mean of the
values of the three dummy variables and serves as a proxy for the overall
level of third-party protection that a LLC statute offers. The index can
take the values zero, V3, %, and one. The higher the index, the higher is
the level of third-party protection.
As Table 2 shows, the variable Agency Powers Modifications is positively
correlated with the dependent variable, but it is not in all models
statistically significant. Veil Piercing and Member Disclosure were not
significant in any of the models tested. The Third-Party Protection Index
was marginally significant in some models, and insignificant in others.
The results of the index are driven by the variable Agency Powers
Modifications. When this variable is excluded from the index, the index
7 See supra text accompanying note 43.
76 Dammann & Schindeln, supra note 16, at 8, app. at 39,46-47 (naming the variable "Formalities").
7 See id. at 7-8.
78 I coded the variable based on a tabulation of state-law provisions concerning required disclosures
compiled by RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, app. 4-5.
FOR A FEWDOLLARS LESS
loses its significance. Hence, my results cannot be taken as evidence that
LLCs are more popular in those states that protect third parties better.
These negative findings were not necessarily to be expected in light of
the intuition that businesses prefer lax third-party protections, which
would allow them to impose external costs on voluntary or involuntary
creditors. Indeed, Dammann and Schuindeln found that LLCs are more
likely to be formed in the state of their primary place of business if that
state prohibits piercing the LLC veil for nonobservance of formalities.
However, Kobayashi and Ribstein were unable to replicate this result in
their study.' My data likewise do not show a relationship between those
third-party protections that I tested and the variation in LLC popularity.
One reason for the negative finding could be that provisions in LLC
statutes that aim to protect third-parties do not have enough practical
importance as to affect the popularity of the LLC form. For once, the
statutory provisions might not be very effective. Alternatively, businesses
may not have incentives to externalize costs on third parties even if no
statutory protections were in place. Thus, for instance, an LLC may
voluntarily honor a contract that one of its members has signed on its
behalf in excess of his authority," because the company could lose its
reputation as a reliable business partner if it dishonored the contract.82
My findings do not provide a positive answer to the question of how
much bite the third-party protections that I tested have. Nevertheless, my
findings suggest that the importance of these provisions should not be
overestimated.
3. Fiduciary Duties
I tested three dummy variables concerning the fiduciary duties of
LLC members and managers. The first variable, Fiduciary Duties Waivable,
was coded by Kobayashi & Ribstein and takes the value one for those 14
states that allow all fiduciary duties (i.e., the duty of care, the duty of
loyalty and the duty of good faith) to be waived, and zero for all other
7 Dammann & Schtindeln, supra note 16, at 16.
8 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, spra note 17, at 120 tbL3A, 122 tbL3B, 124 tbL3C, 127 tbL4.
81 For a policy analysis of different rules on the transparency of agency power restrictions of LLC
members, see David M. Deaton, Cha*-de-Bac: An Opportunity for Stos to Take Anodier Lsok at Business
Fonnation, 52 SMU L REV. 1741,1777-78 (1999).
8 This argument is of course based on Stewart Macaulay's famous finding that, at least in local
business relations, social relations are much more important to businesspeople than legal rights and duties. See
gnerally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contactal Rdations in Business: A Prdiminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55
(1963).
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states. The second variable, Duty of Care Modifiable, was coded by
Dammann and Schindeln and takes the value one for those 40 states in
which the duty of care can be waived or modified, and zero for all other
states.' The third variable, Gross Negligence, which was also coded by
Dammann and Schiindeln, takes the value one for those 23 states in
which fiduciary duties are limited to grossly negligent or willful conduct,
unless the parties have agreed otherwise, and zero for all other states.85
Based on these variables, I created a Fiduciary Duties Index, which reflects
the degree to which fiduciary duties can be waived or modified. The
index is an ordinal variable that takes the value three if all fiduciary duties
(duty of care, duty of loyalty and duty of good faith) can be waived, two if
only the duty of care can be waived or modified, one if fiduciary duties
may not be waived, but are by default limited to grossly negligent or
willful conduct, and zero if fiduciary duties may not be waived and are not
limited to grossly negligent or willful conduct by default.8 6
None of the fiduciary duties variables were statistically significant in
any of the models tested. In other words, the data show no connection
between the popularity of the LLC and the extent to which LLC statutes
allow people to waive or relax the fiduciary duties of LLC members and
managers. This result contrasts with Dammann and Schindeln's finding
that larger LLCs "are migrating away from states with lax norms on
managerial liability,"" but it is consistent with Kobayashi and Ribstein's
8 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 104-105, app. at 138-39 (naming the variable "Fiduciary
Waiver"). I revised the values for those three states whose statutes I read differently. California law refers to
the law of partnerships in this matter, see CAL CORP. CODE S 17153 (West 2011), which restricts the
waivability of both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. CAL CORP. CODE 5 16103(b)(3)-(4) (West 2011).
Utah and Wisconsin only allow contracting for higher liability standards than the statutory default. See UTAH
CODEANN. 5 48-2c-807(1)(c) (West 2011); Wis. STAT. S 183.0402(3) (2011).
8 See Dammann & Schundeln, supra note 16, at 13, app. at 39, 45-46 (naming the variable
"Care_TwoAlt").
a See id. at 12, app. at 39,44-45 (naming the variable "Care One").
8 The Fiduciary Duties Index is calculated from the three dummy variables just described as follows:
Sub-Table 2.
Values
Fiduciary Duties Waivable 1 0 0 0
Duty ofCare Modifiable 1 1 0 0
Gross Negligence 0 or 1 0 or 1 1 0
Fiduciary Duties Index 3 2 1 0
8 See Dammann & Schindeln, supra note 16, at 18.
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results, who did not find evidence that LLCs flee states with lax fiduciary
standards.8
4. Small Business Default Rules
I tested three dummy variables relating to default rules that can be
assumed to fit the needs of small companies.' The first variable, Profits
per Capita, takes the value one for those 18 states in which profits or losses
are allocated to LLC members per capita unless members have agreed
otherwise, and zero for all other states." The second variable, Vote per
Capita, takes the value one for those 29 states in which each of the LLC
members has one vote unless members have agreed otherwise, and zero
for all other states.9 1 The third dummy variable, Member Management,
takes the value one for those 44 states in which LLCs are managed by all
of their members unless members have agreed otherwise, and zero for all
other states.' I also combined the three dummy variables in a Small-
Business Default Index. That index variable is the arithmetic mean of the
values of the three dummy variables and can take the values zero, Va, %,
and one.
None of these variables were statistically significant in any of the
models tested. Thus, my data show no connection between the
popularity of the LLC and the content of default rules.
This result qualifies the importance of default rules in LLC statutes.
A number of authors have argued that default rules in LLC statutes matter
to business organizers,' and that the optimal default rule should suit the
needs of small companies.94 They thus implicitly endorse the theory of
8 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 120 tbL3A, 122 tbl3B, 124 tbL3C, 127 tbl.4, 133-34.
8 Cf Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Foms for Closely Held Firms: Thwries and Evidence from LLCs, 73
WASH. U. L Q. 369, 412-13 (1995) (arguing that member management suits the needs of small companies
and discussing a number of objections to this hypothesis), 419-21 (arguing that per capita allocation of voting
and financial rights suits the needs of small company because these arrangements correlate with member
management and the restricted transferability of ownership interests and avoid valuation and record-keeping
problems).
9 The coding is my own based on RmmIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, app. 5-2 (tabulating default
allocation of profits, losses and distributions).
91 The coding is my own based on id. app. 8-4 (tabulating the default allocation of member votes).
9 The coding is my own based on id. app. 8-2 (tabulating the default method of management).
93 See id. S 3:2 (citing drafting costs, information costs concerning potential contract provisions, and
uncertainty about courts' willingness to enforce agreements that deviate from the statute as reasons); see also
Friedman, supra note 8, at 42 (citing the fact that LLC default rules are more suited to small businesses than
corporate default rules as an advantage).
9 One group of scholars explains this by the fact that small companies are the largest numbers and
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the so-called "majoritarian defaults,"" according to which those terms that
most contracting parties would have wanted should be the default rules.96
This would minimize overall transaction costs.' As mentioned, however,
my data do not support this theory. A likely reason is that the transaction
costs of contracting around a default rule are low enough not to prevent
people from organizing an LLC when they would want to change the
default rules." Relatedly, practitioners widely use form LLC
agreements," and templates for LLC operating agreements are easily
available.'" This further reduces the costs of avoiding unsuitable defaults.
Moreover, it is unclear whether majoritarian defaults are optimal at all: A
competing theory, called the theory of "penalty defaults," states that it is
sometimes efficient to have default rules that induce parties to state
explicitly those contract terms that are important to them.o1 Yet both
proponents and critics of penalty defaults acknowledge the difficulties that
most price-sensitive towards customized contracting. See Ribstein, supra note 89, at 374; see also Kobayashi &
Ribstein, supra note 17, at 98; RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, at S 3:2. Deaton argues that defaults
should protect those parties who do not retain a lawyer when forming an LLC. Deaton, supra note 81, at 1768.
This view arguably leads to the same result because larger businesses can be expected to be more likely to
retain a lawyer when forming an LLC.
9 The term was coined in an article by Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Eonomic Theoy of Defauk Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 93 (1989) (distinguishing "majoritarian defaults"
from their competing rationale of default rules, called "penalty" or "minoritarian" defaults).
9 Id. at 88-90.
9 Id. Perhaps the most prominent followers of the majoritarian defaults theory in the law of
business organizations are Frank R Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel. See FRANK R EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991) ("Corporate law ... fills
in the blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the
problems....").
98 Cf DOUGLAS BAIRD Er AL, GAME THEORY AND THE IAw 150 (1994) (stating that default rules
matter most when transaction costs are at an intermediate level).
9 See Sandra K Miller, A New Direction for LLC Resarh in a Contractarian Lega Environment, 76 S.
CAL L. REv. 351, 383, 399 (2003) (discussing a survey among 77 0 attormeys in four states, in which over two
thirds of the respondents confirmed the widespread use of form LLC agreements). See also Miller et al., supra
note 14, at 622 (reporting that a survey among more than 500 lawyers in five states showed that lawyers are
often asked to form "no-frills" LLC agreements).
10 See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, apps. B1-B6, B8; CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S.
KLEINBERGER, LIMrED LABItnY COMPANIES: TAXAND BUsINESS IAW app. A (2010), available at Westlaw
WGL-LLC; MARK A SARGENT AND WALTER D. SCHWIDEIZKY, LIMITED LIABILIY COMPANY
HANDBOOK apps. ST. to WI (2010), available at Westlaw SECLLCHB. Hence, the finding of Miller and
coauthors is surprising that even lawyers frequently form LLCs without an operating agreement. See Miller et
al., supra note 14, at 622.
to See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 97-100; see also Ian Ayres, The Possibility ofIneficient Corporate
Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L REV. 388, 390 (1991) (arguing that with regard to corporate law, corporate contracts
may be inefficient even if transaction costs to contract around a given default are zero).
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lawmakers face when called to identify the situations in which a penalty
default is efficient.l" All of these factors may, alternatively or collectively,
render irrelevant the content of the small business default rules.
5. Mandatory Rules
I created a Mandatory Rules Index to test whether some of the variation
in LLC popularity could be explained by the rigidity of LLC statutes. I
measure the rigidity of an LLC statute by the extent to which it contains
mandatory rules, that is, rules that the parties may not override by
contract. The index represents the arithmetic mean of nine variables,
namely (1) Unanimous Dissolution, (2) Unanimous Management Transfer, (3)
Oppression Statute, (4) the inverse of Fiduciary Duties Waivable, (5) the
inverse of Duty of Care Waivable, (6) Member Disclosure, (7) Merger
Restrictions, (8) Mandatory Contribution, and (9) No Certificates." Index
values may range from zero to one, in increments of one ninth. The
higher the index, the more rules are mandatory. The Mandatory Rules
Index is an imperfect measurement of the rigidity of LLC statutes because
it does not contain all mandatory statutory provisions, and because it
weighs all index components equally. However, there is no better
measure for the rigidity of LLC statutes.'04 It is also noteworthy that the
102 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1609
(1999); Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Asant of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1547 (1999)
(criticizing the concept of penalty defaults).
103 The index components are described above. See supra notes 41 (Unanimous Management
Transfer), 62 (Unanimous Dissolution and Oppression Statute), 79 (Member Disclosure), 84 (Fiduciary
Duties Waivable), and 85 (Duty of Care Waivable). The dummy variables Merger Restritions and Mandatory
Contribution are the inverse of variables coded by Kobayashi and Ribstein. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra
note 17, at 105, app. at 138-39 (naming the variables "Merger" and "Contribution"). Merger Restntions takes
the value one for those 36 states in which LLCs are not allowed to merge with all types of entities, and zero for
all other states. Mandatory Contribution takes the value one for those 9 states in which all LLC members must
make a contribution to or have an economic interest in the company, and zero for all other states. The
dummy variable No Cersicates is my own coding based on a tabulation in RIBEFN & KEATINGE, supra
note 41, app. 7-8. The variable takes the value one for those 33 states in which LLCs may not issue certificates
of interest, and zero for all other states. For the calculation of the index I inverted the values for Fiduciary Duties
Waipable, Duty of Care Waivable, Merger Restrictions and Mandatory Contribution so that the value one represents
the mandatory character of the rule.
104 Kobayashi and Ribstein, for instance, tested the prevalence of mandatory rules with only three
variables, namely Fiduciary Dutit Waiwable, Mergr Restrictions, and Mandatory Contribution. See Kobayashi &
Ribstein, supra note 17, at 104-05. As mentioned, I also included these variables in my index.
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index values are distributed normally, as one might expect the number of
mandatory rules in LLC statutes to be.'05
The Mandatory Rules Index was not statistically significant in any of the
models tested. Thus, the data do not show a connection between LLC
popularity and the rigidity of LLC statutes. This finding corresponds with
Kobayashi and Ribstein's results, who found no connection between three
mandatory rules and an LLC's likelihood to be formed in a state that is
different from the state of their primary place of business.'o
6. Conclusion: Is LLC Law Trivial?
From a lawyer's perspective, substantive rules may be a key factor in
entity choice.o'0 Yet at state level, different substantive rules do not
explain the variation in LLC popularity very well. Most substantive law
variables were either not statistically significant at all or, in a few cases, just
marginally significant. Only one of them, Default Withdrawal Right, was
significant and robust, but it is hard to explain why a default rule that
gives LLC members a right to withdraw from the company would affect
the popularity of the LLC, but none of the many other statutory rules.
Furthermore, the indices that I tested were only statistically significant to
the extent that one of their component variables was.
All of this suggests that state LLC law is trivial, just like Professor
Black has famously argued with regard to state corporate law.'
According to Black, corporate law is trivial because it "does not prevent
companies . . . from establishing any set of governance rules they want."'09
Triviality may have several causes: Some rules mimic the market because
they prescribe what the parties would have contracted for anyway."0
Other rules can be avoided, either because they are mere defaults or, if
105 A Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal distribution yielded a p value of 0.47 for the Mandatory Rules
Index. Therefore, the hypothesis that the values of the index come from a normally distributed population
cannot be rejected.
106 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 119 tbL3A, 121 tbL3B, 123 thl.3C, 126 thL4, 132.
107 Correspondingly, there is a considerable amount of practitioner-oriented literature on entity
choice. As to the LLC form specifically see, for example, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41; J. WILLIAM
CALUISON & MAUREEN A. SUUIVAN, LIMITED LIABluTY COMPANIES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO
lAWAND PRACTICE (2010), available at Wesdaw L.C; BISHOP&KLENBERGER, supra note 100.
108 See Bernhard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Politial and EconomicAnalys, 84 Nw. U. L. REV.
542(1990).
109 Id. at 544.
no Id. at 552.
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they are mandatory, because they can be circumvented easily."' Finally, a
given rule may be unimportant because it can easily be complied with or
because the situation to which it applies almost never occurs.1 2  In a
similar vein, Kobayashi and Ribstein surmise that even mandatory
provisions in LLC statutes may not be very restrictive.'
It shall be left to future research to assess the triviality of the various
rules that can be found in LLC statutes. At this general level, though, it
seems plausible that LLC law is trivial in that it does not affect entity
choice because many important features of the LLC, such as limited
liability, flexible taxation,1 4 and the permissibility of single-member
LLCs,"' are uniform across all states. Compared to these inherent
advantages of the LLC form, the remaining state-to-state differences may
not be important enough to become apparent in the aggregate filing
statistics.
C. The "Freedom of Contract" Puzzle
As mentioned, Dammann and Schindeln's Freedom of Contract variable
turns on whether an LLC statute expressly provides that "maximum
effect" shall be given to the principle of "freedom of contract."" These
provisions vary little from state to state."' A typical example is S 1101(b)
of Delaware's Limited Liability Company Act, which reads: "It is the
il" Id. at 555.
112 Id. at 560.
13 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 132.
114 See supra note 49 and accompanying text
15 All LLC statutes now allow single-member LLCs. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, app.
4-4 (tabulating state statutes).
116 See supra p. 14 and note 39.
17 The provisions usually follow the formula: "It is the [intent/policy] of [this state/this statute/the
legislature] to give [the] maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of
[limited liability company] operating agreements." The few deviations are indicated in the parentheticals of
the following citations. See ARI. CODE ANN. S 4-32-1304(a) (2011); CoLo. REv. STAT. S 7-80-108(4)
(2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. S 34-242(a) (2011); DEL. CODE tit. 6, 5 18-1101(b) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. S
14-11-1107(b) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. 17-76,134(b) (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 275.003(1) (West
2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 12:1367(B) (2011) (no reference to operating agreements); ME. REv. STAT. tit
31, S 753(1) (repealed 2009); MIsS. CODE ANN. S 79-29-1201(2) (amended 2010); Mo. REV. STAT.
347.081(2) (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. S 304-C:78(1l) (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. 42:2B-66(a) (West 2011) ("This
act is to be liberally construed to give the maximum effect . . ."); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 53-19-65(A) (2011);
OKlA STAT. tit 18, S 2058(D) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. S 48-2c-1901 (West 2011) VA. CODE ANN. S
13.1-1001.1(C) (2011) ("This chapter shall be construed in furtherance of the policies of giving maximum
effect. . ."); WASH. REV. CODE S 25.15.800(2) (2011); Wis. STAT. 5 183.1302(1) (2011).
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policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company
agreements."' 18 Dammann and Schuindeln hypothesized that business
organizers appreciate such commitments to contractual freedom,"' but
did not find a connection between the Freedom of Contract variable and out-
of-state formations of LLCs.120
I find that LLCs are more popular in those states whose statutes
expressly endorse contractual freedom. The variable was significant with
p:0.01 or p50.05 in all models tested, no matter which of the three
dependent variables I used. The Freedom of Contract variable alone explains
about 10% of the variation in LLC popularity.
It is difficult to explain this finding in a convincing manner.
Dammann and Schuindeln, the creators of the Freedom of Contract variable,
appear to have hypothesized that business organizers appreciate legislative
commitments to contractual freedom.12' This assumption seems intuitive,
but it is difficult to identify the channels through which a freedom of
contract provision would boost LLC popularity. If states use these
provisions to signal a favorable business climate, one would not expect the
LLC to be the only business form to benefit from it. Moreover, the
Freedom of Contract variable expresses a mere commitment to contractual
freedom but does not necessarily reflect the actual degree of contractual
freedom that the organizers of an LLC enjoy. Business organizers' actual
freedom of contract is limited by the extent to which an LLC statute
contains mandatory rules, which they may not override contractually.
Therefore, one would expect the Mandatory Rules Index, which indicates
how many rules out of a sample of nine rules are mandatory, to be
negatively correlated with the popularity of the LLC. However, this is not
the case." I also tested for interaction between Freedom of Contract and the
Mandatory Provisions Index, but found none that was statistically significant.
Thus, the explanatory power of the Freedom of Contract variable does not
depend on the prevalence of mandatory provisions in an LLC statute. In
other words, LLCs are equally more popular in those states whose statutes
118 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, S 18-1101(b) (2011).
" See Damnann & Schindeln, supra note 16, at 14.
120 See id. at 16 tbl2.
121 The authors did not state their hypothesis expressly but say that their variable targets "drastic
commitments" to contractual fieedom. Dammann & Schiindeln, supra note 16, at 14.
122 The index is positively correlated with the dependent variable, but it is not significant See supra
Part Il.B.4.
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expressly endorse contractual freedom, no matter if these statutes have
many or few mandatory rules."
An alternative explanation for the significance of the Freedom of
Contract variable has less to do with contractual freedom as such than with
legal certainty.'2 4 Business organizers may worry that a couple of years
down the road a judge might alter the contractual duties they had agreed
upon in the articles of organization or in the operating agreement.
Business organizers may view a "freedom of contract" provision as an
assurance that courts will stick to the terms of the original contract and
refrain from rewriting the contract. This interpretation is consistent with
the triviality hypothesis discussed above'25 because an assurance that
courts will not rewrite a contract has value even when the parties are
completely free in their contracting. However, we do not know whether
business organizers or their attorneys are aware of "freedom of contract"
provisions and believe that they have the desired effect on judges.
Independently thereof, a "freedom of contract" provision may not be
necessary to restrain judges from rewriting the LLC's founding
documents because even those statutes that do not have an express
"freedom of contract" provision do provide that the articles of
organization or the operating agreement may include any provision that is
not prohibited by law or (in the case of the operating agreement) by the
articles of organization.126
The correlation between the popularity of the LLC and the Freedom of
Contract variable may also be due to a confounding factor that is correlated
with the Freedom of Contract variable. Such a factor is not easy to find,
however. For instance, none of the many variables that I tested in this
123 1 also found that the coefficient of the Mandatory Provisions Index does not depend on whether a
state has a freedom of contract provision or not. LLC popularity is unrelated with the prevalence of
mandatory rules, no matter whether a state expressly endorses contractual freedom.
124 I owe this suggestion to ProfessorJens Dammann.
125 See supra Part ll.B.6.
126 See ALA. CODE S5 1OA-5-2.02 to -4.03(a) (2011); ALASKA STAT. 5 10.50.075(6) (2011) AIUz. REV.
STAT. ANN. 55 29-632(B), -682(B) (2011); CAL CORP. CODE S 17005(b) (West 2011); D.C. CODE SS 29-
1018(a), -1006(b) (2011); FLA. STAT. 5S 608.407(1), .423(1) (2011); IND. CODE 5 23-18-2-4(b)(5), -4-5
(2011); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 156C, S 12(a)(9) (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS 5450.4203(2) (2011); MINN.
STAT. 55 322B.115(5), .603(1) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 21-2606(2)(b) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 586-
161(2) (West 2011); N.Y LTD. LIAB. Co. LAw 55 203(e)(7), 417(a) (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. S
57C-2-21(b) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE S§10-32-07(5), -68(1) (2011); OHIO REV. CODEANN. S 1705.04(A)
(LexisNexis 2011); OR. REV. STAT. 55 63.047(2), .057 (2011); 15 PA. CONs. STAT. 55 8913(8), 8916(b)
(2011); RI. GEN. LAWS S 7-16-6(a)(5) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. 5S 48-249-202(b)(1)(B), -205(a) (2011);
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. 55 101.054, .052(c)-(d) (West 2011); Uniform limited Liability Company Act
(ULLCA) SS 103(a), 203(b)(2) (1996); RULLCA SS 303(2), 703(1) (2006).
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study are strongly correlated with the Freedom of Contract variable. It is
noteworthy, though, that the "freedom of contract" provisions vary little
from state to state.127 This suggests that state legislatures have copied
them from other states that had enacted their LLC statutes earlier. It
could be that they have copied other characteristics of the same statutes as
well, which, in their entirety, are more attractive to business organizers
than the statutes of other states. In other words, those LLC statutes that
contain a "freedom of contract" provision might belong to a whole family
of popular LLC statutes.
Last but not least, there is always the possibility that the significance of
the Freedom of Contract variable is a random result."2
In light of the foregoing, it would be premature to deliver a definitive
verdict on the puzzle that the predictive power of the Freedom of Contract
variable presents. I leave it to future researchers to solve the puzzle.
D. What Does Not Explain the State-to-State Variation
The variation in LLC popularity cannot be explained by the
uniformity or age of LLC statutes, by the degree of debtor protection that
an LLC statute offers, or the possibility of forming series LLCs.
1. Uniformity of Statutes
Uniformity of LLC statutes can be achieved in two ways, either
through the adoption of a model act, that is, the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (ULLCA) of 1996 or the Revised Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA) of 2006,129 or when
legislatures copy parts of one another's statutes.'30 Kobayashi and Ribstein
call the latter phenomenon "spontaneous uniformity.""3 ' Spontaneous
uniformity is of gradual character, depending on how strongly the statutes
resemble one another.
Following Dammann and Schiindeln, I tested a dummy variable
named ULLCA, which takes the value one for those 10 states in my
127 See supra note 117.
128 Since I tested a large number of variables, the likelihood that one or two of them are significant by
chance is substantial. See supra Table 1 and text accompanying note 37.
129 Both are available at the website of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL), httpv/www.nccusLorgf.
' See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 6 (arguing that this spontaneous uniformity of LLC statutes is
efficient).
131 Id.
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dataset that had adopted either the ULLCA or the RULLCA, and zero for
all other states.13 2  Additionally, I tested three index variables coded by
Kobayashi and Ribstein that measure the degree of spontaneous
uniformity of LLC statutes:133 Uniform Third-Party Provisions measures the
degree of uniformity of a set of statutory provisions concerning the
protection of third-parties,'" Uniform Member Provisions measures the
uniformity of a set of member-related provisions," and Uniform Tax
Provisions provides analogous numbers for a set of tax-related provisions. 3 6
For each of these variables, Kobayashi and Ribstein defined a set of
provisions that the variable should include.' Then, they determined the
uniformity measure for each state with regard to each provision. For
example, each of the 19 states that have a "freedom of contract provision"
would have a uniformity measure of 19 for that type of provision. Finally,
Kobayashi and Ribstein calculated the average uniformity measure for
each state and each index. In addition to testing the uniformity variables
individually, I compounded them into a Uniformity Index. To calculate the
index values, I divided the values of each of the three uniformity variables
by the mean of the respective variable and then added the results up.'
None of these variables were significant in the regression analyses.
Thus, the variation in LLC popularity can neither be explained by the
degree to which LLC statutes are uniform nor by the fact that a particular
state has or has not adopted ULLCA or the RULLCA.
132 The ULLCA was adopted by Alabama, Illinois, Montana, Hawaii, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont and West Virginia. For references see Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 41, 5 1:8. Idaho and Iowa
adopted the RULLCA in 2008. See supra note 34. The number of positive values in the ULLCA variable is
different from Dammann & Schuindeln's coding because their reference date was January 1, 2007. Cf
Dammann & Schindeln, supra note 16, at 7.
133 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 107-08, app. at 138-39.
13 The values of the variable range from 17.6 to 30.8; the arithmetic mean is 26.5. Standard
deviation is 2.3. See id. app. at 138-39.
135 The values of the variable range from 103 to 36.3, the arithmetic mean is 29.1. Standard deviation
is 6.5. See id.
136 The values of the variable range from 13.9 to 21.3, the arithmetic mean is 182. Standard deviation
is 1.7. See id.
137 For the original table of the 69 provisions included in the three indices see Kobayashi & Ribstein,
supra note 6, at 474-75. The authors cataloged 34 third-party provisions, 31 member-related provisions, and 4
tax provisions. Id. at 476. The authors later updated their list to include 39 third-party provisions, 30
member-related provisions, and 4 tax provisions. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, The Non-
Uniformity of Uniform Laws, 35 J. CORP. L 327, 332-37 tbl.1 (2009). The authors do not state whether the
index values in their 2011 study are based on the original or the updated list of provisions. Cf Kobayashi &
Ribstein, supra note 17, at 107 and app. at 138-39.
13 The index values range from 2.35 to 3.54, the mean is 3.0, and standard deviation is 027.
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These results add to the existing evidence that the uniformity of LLC
statutes is unrelated to the popularity of LLCs. At the outset, there are
reasons to believe that there is a positive relationship between statutory
uniformity and LLC popularity. Ribstein has shown that those states that
were not among the first to adopt an LLC statute tended to adopt rules
that he assumes to be more efficient than the rules that were dominant in
the early statutes.' 9 Relatedly, Kobayashi and Ribstein have shown that
LLC statutes have achieved a substantial degree of uniformity with respect
to those rules whose uniformity is likely to be beneficial for businesses."
Thus, one might expect LLCs to be more popular in those states that have
more uniform statutes. However, neither Kobayashi and Ribstein in their
study on out-of-state LLC formations141 nor I have found a statistically
significant relationship between statutory uniformity and LLC popularity.
As Kobayashi and Ribstein note, this could be either because states have
already achieved a high level of uniformity, or because most provisions in
LLC statutes are mere default rules.
In addition, my findings have implications for the critique of the
uniform LLC acts, ULLCA and RULLCA. Ribstein and Kobayashi have
repeatedly criticized these acts for containing many peculiar provisions
that are not found in other LLC statutes, and for having failed to achieve
uniformity. 43 Correspondingly, Dammann and Schiindeln found that
LLCs with twenty or more employees are less likely to be formed in the
state of their primary place of business if that state has adopted the
ULLCA.'" Kobayashi and Ribstein, however, did not find that
relationship in their similar study, regardless of firm size.'45 My study
adds to the evidence that the potential drawbacks of the uniform acts are
not big enough to adversely affect the popularity of the LLC in states that
have adopted the uniform acts. The uniform acts may have theoretical
139 See Ribstein, supra note 89, at 412-28.
140 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 6, at 472-73.
141 Cf Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 120 tbl3A, 122 tbl3B, 124 tbl3C, 126 tbl.4A, 132.
142 Id. at 107-08, 132.
143 See, e.g., Lary E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Unform Laws, Model Laus and Limited Liality
Companies, 66 U. COLo. L REV. 947 (1995); see also Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 138, at 4-6 (arguing,
based on their data, that the ULLCA decreased uniformity of LLC statutes because it was promulgated-and
its peculiar provisions were adopted by a few states-after the states had achieved uniformity), 10-20
(analyzing the uniformity of the provisions of the RULLCA).
144 See Dammann & Schuindeln, supra note 16, at 16, 18-19 (finding significance at the p50.10, 0.05
and 0.01 levels, depending on model specification).
145 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 119-125 tbls.3A, 3B & 3C.
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drawbacks, but these do not translate into measurable differences in LLC
popularity in the real world.
2. Age of LLC Statute
Following Dammann and Schiindeln, I tested whether the variation
in LLC popularity could be explained by the age of LLC statutes. The
values of the variable LLC Statute Age equal the logarithm'" of the
number of years since a state's first LLC statute entered into force.'47
The variable LLC Statute Age was not significant in any of the
regressions. Hence, the age of LLC statutes does not explain the variation
in LLC popularity.
This finding is only partially in line with prior literature. In the
business planning literature, the "relative newness of the LLC form" is
sometimes cited as a disadvantage.'48 Similarly, Dammann and Schiindeln
hypothesized that the LLC might be more popular in those states with
older statutes, notably because lawyers and courts become more
experienced with the new business form over time.14 The empirical
evidence is mixed. Dammann and Schfindeln found that LLCs are more
likely to be formed in the state of their primary place of business if that
state has enacted its first LLC statute early, but their results were only
significant in a small fraction of their regression models.'s Kobayashi and
Ribstein found no significant relationship between the state of formation
of LLCs and the age of LLC statutes."' My findings cast additional doubt
on the theory that the attractiveness of a particular LLC statute is related
to that statute's age.
It may seem puzzling that the popularity of LLCs is unrelated to an
LLC statute's age, even though LLCs do get more popular over time.s 2
One potential explanation is that the age of LLC statutes does not vary
greatly. 49 jurisdictions enacted their first LLC law between 1990 and
' I logged the variable in oner to render the regression residuals normal.
147 As to the reasons for focusing on the first statute (and ignoring if a statute has been replaced since
then) see Dammann & Schiindeln, supra note 16, at 14-15 (predicting that the experience of judges and
lawyers with LLCs will not be lost when the original LLC statute is replaced by a new one).
" See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, S 2:38 (referring to the hypothesis that business entities
are subject to network effects); CAILIsON & SuLLIvAN, supra note 107, S 2:20 (citing the smaller degree of
legal certainty about the quality of the liability shield).
149 Dammann & Sch(indeln, supra note 16, at 14.
so Id.
151 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 119 TbL3A, 121 tbL3B, 123 tbl3C, 126 tbL4, 132.
152 Sewsupra Figure 2.
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1997, and 37 alone between 1992 and 1994.153 One would need a
longitudinal study to find out whether the age of an LLC statute explained
the variation in LLC popularity in the 1990s, when LLC statutes were still
very young. Another explanation might be that the "start date" for the
growth in popularity of LLCs was "reset" in 1997, when the IRS enacted
its "check-the-box" regulations. Before the "check-the-box" regulations,
the eligibility of LLCs to be taxed as pass-through entities was limited,'"
which is why some states designed their LLC statutes in a way that
ensured that LLCs would qualify for pass-through taxation.'s The
"check-the-box" regulations removed the prior restrictions, thus giving
the LLC an important boost.'56 Correspondingly, Ribstein and Kobayashi
found that LLC-to-LLP ratios increased significantly in the years
following the enactment of the "check-the-box" regulations.15  Hence,
the "check-the-box" regulations may have influenced LLC popularity
more than the year in which states had enacted their first LLC statute.
3. Series LLCs
A series LLC is an LLC that is divided into separate divisions.5 ' Each
division's assets are shielded against liability for the debt of the other
divisions of the series.159  The possibility of forming series LLCs can be
seen as a bulk discount on formation fees and the costs of keeping
multiple LLCs active." The dummy variable Series LLC takes the value
1s3 For a detailed statistic see Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 6, at 472-73.
154 Under the precursor of the "check-the-box" regulations, the so-called Kintner regulations, an
LLC was not eligible for partnership taxation if it had more than two corporate characteristics. See Treas. Reg.
S 301.7701-2, 32 Fed. Reg. 15241, 15372-73 (Nov. 3, 1967) (amended 1977, 1983 and 1993, revised 1997);
Debra R Cohen, Citizenship ofLimited Liability Companiesfor Diversityjurisdiction, 6J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus.
L. 435, 445 n.46 (2002); Carol J. Miller, Douglas J. March & Jack E. Kams, Limited Liability Companies Before
and After the january 1997 IRS "Check-the-Box" Regulations: Choice of Entity and Taxation Considerations, 25 N. KY.
L. REV. 585,587 (1998).
155 See Cohen, supra note 154, at 447 & n.55.
156 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 154, at 447-48 ("The LLC's toehold in the spectrum of business
organizations became more firmly established."); Don W. Llewellyn & Anne O'Connell Umbrecht, No Choice
ofEntityAfter Check-The-Box, 52 TAXLAW. 1, 33 (1998) ("[T]he Treasury has capitulated to the [LLC] trend . .
The LLC is a gift horse.").
157 See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 10, at 126, 138 tbl.4 (finding a statistically significant increase
of LLC-to-LLP ratios in 1998 and 1999, the two years following the enactment of the "check-the-box"
regulations, but not in the years 1995-1997).
'" See CARTANO, supra note 49, 1 2501.
159 Id.
160 I owe this analysis to Professor Lynn M. LoPucki.
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one for those 10 states that permit the formation of series LLCs, and zero
for all other states.161
The Series LLC variable was not statistically significant in my
regression analysis. In other words, the data do not show a connection
between the possibility of forming series LLCs and LLC popularity. The
reason for this negative finding might be that series LLCs are not popular
enough to affect the statistic. We know little about the prevalence of
series LLCs since only Utah publishes separate filing statistics for series
LLCs. In that state, however, less than 1% of all LLCs formed in 2003
were series LLCs.162 Should the figures be of a similar magnitude in other
states, the availability of series LLCs is not likely to have an impact on the
overall filing statistics.
4. Debtor Protection
If an LLC member defaults on personal debt, the creditors could
either be allowed to trigger the dissolution of the LLC, to receive the
debtor's full membership interest in the LLC (including voting rights and,
potentially, managing rights), or to seek a charging order, through which
they will obtain the rights of an assignee of the debtor's financial interest
in the LLC, but no membership rights.'" Kobayashi and Ribstein
surmised that debtors might prefer to form an LLC under a statute that
limits creditors' rights to obtaining a charging order and thus bars
creditors from managing the company or triggering its dissolution.
They created a dummy variable called Charging Order that takes the value
one for those 23 states in which a charging order is an exclusive remedy
for creditors of LLC members, and zero for all other states."'s They did
161 Presently, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Utah, and Wisconsin allow series LLCs. See CARTANO, supra note 49, 1 2501 (tabulating references to state
statutes). Kobayashi and Ribstein used the same variable, but at the time of their test only six states allowed
series LLCs. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 106, app. at 138-39 (synoptical table).
162 See UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL
CODE, STATISTICS 2009: LIMITED PARTNERSHIP & LIMITED LABILIY COMPANY, available at
httpV/corporations.utah.gov/pd!lcpstats2009.pdf.
163 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 106; CARTANO, supra note 49, 2401.
16 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 106-07. This hypothesis is based on Hansmann,
Kraakman and Squire's insight that "entity shielding"--the shielding of a business entity from its owners'
creditors-is an essential feature of the law of business organizations. See generally Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The Earntial Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE LJ. 387 (2000); Henry Hansmann,
Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and die Rise of dte Finn, 119 HARV. L REV. 1333 (2006); Larry
Ribstein, The Important Role ofNon-Organization Ino, 40 WAKE FOREST L REv. 751, 760-61, 786-88 (2005).
165 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 106 and app. at 138-39 (synoptical tables).
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not find the variable statistically significant."' In my regression analysis,
the Charging Order variable was likewise not significant in any of the
models tested. The exclusivity of a charging order is perhaps a weak
shield from creditors, because creditors could challenge the use of an LLC
for debtor protection by other means."s7
E. California's Ban of Professional LLCs
LLC statutes do not vary greatly as to the kinds of businesses they
allow LLCs to conduct. 50 LLC statutes either allow LLCs to be formed
for any lawful business or prohibit a small range of specified businesses
whose numbers are typically small, such as banks or insurance
companies. t" The one exception is California, which prohibits LLCs
from providing professional services.'16  That state has an exceptionally
low LLC-to-corporations ratio, too. For example, model (5) in Table 2
predicts for California an LLC-to-corporations ratio of 2.03,170 yet the
state's actual ratio is 0.87. California's residual is also the largest of all
states in this model. It is unknown how many professional entities there
are in California."' If their numbers are small, California's ban of
professional LLCs would not greatly affect the overall popularity of the
LLC.'72 Due to the lack of such data it is impossible to positively attribute
California's low LLC-to-corporations ratio to its ban of professional
LLCs.
F. The Big Picture: LLC Popularity and the Wild West
The factors that explain the state-to-state variation in LLC popularity
are reminiscent of the Wild West-hence the title of this study: 7 1 Money
166 See id. at 132.
167 See id. at 106-07 (stating that creditors could invoke the doctrines of veil piercing or fraudulent
conveyance).
168 See, e.g., RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, app. at 4-9; supra note 49, 203.01.
169 See CAL CORP. CODE S 17375 (West 2006). Like all other jurisdictions, California allows
professional corporations. See Moscone-Knox Professional Corporation Act, CAL CORP. CODE 5 13400-
13410 (West 2006).
170 The predicted value for the dependent variable LLCs over Domestic Corporations is -0312.
Accordingly, the predicted LLC-to-corporations ratio for California is 277-e-0312 = 203 (2.77 is the median
LLC-to-corporations ratio for 2009, the year of observation). For the inverse formula see supra note 27.
171 California does not publish separate filing statistics for professional corporations.
172 I owe this suggestion to Professor Lynn M. LoPucki
173 PER QUALCHE DOuARO IN MENO [FOR A FEW DouARs LESS] (Panda Societa per L'Industria
Cinematografica 1966) is a parody of the classic spaghetti western PER QUAICHE DOuARI IN PIO [FOR A FEW
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is important, legal rules are of dubious significance, and freedom is
appreciated.
First, money is important. LLCs are more popular in those states in
which it the fees for organizing an LLC are lower than the fees for
organizing a corporation, and vice versa. With a pinch of salt, it seems
that people tend to choose the entity that they can get "for a few dollars
less." These formation fee differentials explain between 17% and 28% of
the variation in LLC popularity. In contrast, the data show no
relationship between the popularity of LLCs and differentials in annual
fees and franchise taxes. This is all the more paradoxical as even one
year's differentials in recurring fees and taxes tend to be larger than the
formation fee differentials.
Second, like in the Wild West, legal rules are of dubious significance.
Only one of the many variables that encode substantive rules contained in
LLC statutes was statistically significant and robust, and it is hard to
explain why that rule, but none of the others, should affect the popularity
of the LLC. Thus, LLC law may well be trivial, similar to Black's famous
thesis that state corporate law is trivial:"' Since the most important
characteristics of the LLC are the same in all states, the remaining
differences in substantive LLC laws may simply not be important enough
to affect entity choice to an extent that it would become visible in the
aggregate filing statistics.
Third, (contractual) freedom is appreciated. More specifically, I find
that LLCs are more popular in those states whose LLC statutes explicitly
uphold the principle of contractual freedom. The respective variable is
highly robust and explains about 10% of the variation in LLC popularity.
If this is not a result by chance, it could be viewed as evidence that
"freedom of contract" provisions reassure LLC members that courts will
not rewrite their contracts in case of a lawsuit. Alternatively, "freedom of
contract" provisions might be associated with other popular features of
LLC statutes.
These findings were not necessarily to be expected. Although there
has been anecdotal evidence that the variation in LLC popularity is
associated with different levels of formation fees, the extent to which this
is the case has been unknown hitherto. These fee differentials, which are
relatively small but highly visible when a business entity is formed,
DouAns MoRE] (Produzione Europee Associati et al. 1965), directed by Sergio Leone and starring Clint
Eastwood. Se For a Few Dollars More, IMDB, http-/www.imdb.conVtidtet05957W (last visited Nov. 14,
2011).
174 Sesupra Pan III.B.6.
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explain more of the variation in LLC popularity than all the differences in
substantive LLC law. Even more surprisingly, differentials in annual fees
and entity-level taxes explain none of the variation! In other words, it is
formation fees, not taxes or substantive rules or anything else, that explain
the variation in LLC popularity best. This is the most important result of
this study.
IV. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are plenty of opportunities for future empirical research on
LLC formations and entity choice. I commend four avenues of inquiry
for the consideration of future researchers.
First, future research could explore the costs of organizing a business
entity in more detail. A considerable part of the variation in LLC
popularity can be explained by formation fee differentials. Yet formation
fees are only part of organizing costs, which may also comprise lawyers'
fees or fees charged by specialized firms that help people organize a
company. Business organizers also incur information costs when they
choose an entity. All of these costs may vary according to the type of
entity, and these differentials may themselves vary from state to state. For
instance, Friedman noted that lawyers in Illinois, which has the lowest
LLC-to-corporations ratio in the country, seem to charge more for
organizing an LLC than a corporation.17 The availability of form LLC
agreements could likewise differ from state to state. These kinds of costs
may provide an additional explanation for the variation in LLC popularity.
It would be interesting to analyze these form documents to see whether
they modify non-optimal defaults, thereby creating private standard forms
that supersede the default rules that LLC statutes provide.'
Second, it might be worthwhile to explore the impact of local legal
culture on entity choice. Local legal culture may be defined as "systematic
and persistent variations in local legal practices as a consequence of a
complex of perceptions and expectations shared by many practitioners and
officials in a particular locality, and differing in identifiable ways from
175 Friedman, supra note 8, at 57 & n.109. The website cited by Friedman still exists: Starting a Busines,
TAXPERTS LTD. & MARTIN FREEMAN, CPA, http/www.tapertsltd.com/topics/ssarngbusiness body.htm
(last revised November 2009). According to that website, forming a corporation costs $100 to $500, and
forming an LLC costs $1,000 to $2,500. Id.
176 For a discussion of statutory standard forms in comparison with private standard forms in the LLC
context see Ribstein, supra note 90, at 376-84.
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[other local legal cultures]."" For instance, there is a great deal of
variation in consumer bankruptcy practices that cannot be explained but
by different local legal cultures."' Relatedly, there is evidence that the
attitudes of lawyers and the characteristics of law firms explain some of
the variation in such diverse subject-matters as consumer bankruptcy and
corporate charter terms."'9 The situation may be similar with regard to
the choice of a business entity.'"
Third, the puzzle of the Freedom of Contract variable is still unsolved."'
If the significance of that variable can be verified, one could research the
legislative history of those statutes that have a "freedom of contract"
provision to find out to what extent state legislatures have copied statutes
from other states. The resulting "family tree" of LLC statutes might
reveal whether some families of LLC statutes are more successful than
others.
Fourth, perhaps most importantly, future studies might examine
business entity choices and formations at the individual level, using
company-level data instead of state-level data. A better understanding of
individual choices may inform our understanding of the aggregate
phenomenon, that is, the variation in LLC popularity. For example, a
survey among business organizers might reveal that most of them are
aware of the formation fees, but not of the periodic fees and franchise
taxes. This would explain, at the aggregate level, why formation fees, but
not periodic fees and franchise taxes, account for the variation in LLC
17 Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal
Culture: Twenty Years ofEvidencefrom the Federal Bankruptcy Court, 17 HARv.J.L & PUB. PoLY 801, 804 (1994).
Originally, the term "local legal culture" was coined by Thomas Church in a study on case disposition speed
by criminal trial courts. See THOMAs CHURCH,JR., Er AL,JUSTICE DEIAYED: THE PACE OF LmGATION IN
URBAN TRIAL COURIs 54 (1978) (defining "local legal culture" as "established expectations, practices, and
informal rules of behavior ofjudges and attorneys"). I owe the hint to the concept of "local legal culture" to
Professor Katherine M. Porter.
178 See Sullivan et al., supra note 177, at 812-39 (finding great state-to-state variation in bankruptcy
rates and chapter choice, among other things, over two decades, and explaining the variation by the existence
ofdifferent local legal cultures).
179 SeeJean Braucher, Lauers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANR LJ.
501 (1993) (finding that lawyers influence debtors to choose chapter 7 or chapter 13 based on their own
incentives, attitudes, and beliefs); John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defoser Blame dre
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L REv. 1301 (2001) (finding that the characteristics of law firms determine whether a firm
adopts a takeover defense before its IPO).
15o The studies by Miller, supra note 99, and Miller et al., supra note 14, may serve as a starting point of
such a study.
181 See supra Part II.C.
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popularity." Moreover, a future study might analyze the articles of
organization and operating agreements of a sample of individual
companies, similar to previous studies of public corporations. '" Among
other things, such a study could shed light on such questions as to what
extent business organizers rely on standard form documents'" or what
default rules they modify.
V. CONCLUSIONS
LLCs are much more popular in some states than in others. To
explore potential explanations of the state-to-state variation in LLC
popularity, I performed regression analyses of a partly original dataset of
cross-sectional state-level data. What I found is reminiscent of the Wild
West-hence the title of this study:ss Money is important, legal rules are
of dubious significance, and freedom is appreciated.
Money is important in that formation fee differentials explain
between 17% and 28% of the variation in LLC popularity and thus have
more explanatory power than all other factors together.' Yet,
paradoxically, the data show no relationship between the popularity of
LLCs and differentials in annual fees and franchise taxes.
Legal rules are of dubious significance. Generally, the data show no
connection between the variation in LLC popularity and different types of
substantive rules of LLC statutes.18 7  The only substantive-law variable
that was significant and robust indicates whether a state's LLC statute
allows LLC members to withdraw from the company."' It is hard to
explain why this variable, but none of the others, should affect the
popularity of the LLC. It seems more plausible that this is a random
result, and that substantive LLC law is trivial in the sense that the
182 As to the "fee paradox," see supra Part ULA
183 For a study of takeover defenses in IPO charters, see for example Coates, supra note 179; Robert
Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protation in IPOs, 17 J.L
EcoN. & ORG. 83 (2001); Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takmeer Defenes oflPO Firm, 57 J.
FIN. 1857 (2002); see also Michael J. Whincop, An Empirica Analysis of the Standardisation of Corporate Charter
Tens Opting Out of the Duty of Care, 23 INT'L REV. L. & ECoN. 285 (2003) (studying waivers of the duty of
care in the charters ofa sample ofAustralian public companies).
184 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Similarly, Klausner reports that corporate charters at the
IPO stage vary very little. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian 77wory of Corporate Law: A Generation LAter,
31 J. CORP. L 779, 789-91 (2006).
185 See supra note 173 for a reference.
186 See supra Part EHA
187 See supra Part L.B.
188 See supra p. 26 and notes 40, 62-65.
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differences in substantive LLC laws are not important enough to affect
entity choice, as the most important characteristics of the LLC are the
same in all states.
Freedom is appreciated-that is, LLCs are more popular in those
states whose LLC statutes expressly provide that "maximum effect" shall
be given to the principle of "freedom of contract" than in those states that
do not have such a provision.189 The respective variable is highly robust
and explains about 10% of the variation in LLC popularity. If this is not a
result by chance, it could be viewed as evidence that "freedom of contract"
provisions reassure LLC organizers that courts will not rewrite their
contract in case of a lawsuit. Alternatively, "freedom of contract"
provisions might be associated with other popular features of LLC
statutes.
Several factors do not explain the variation in LLC popularity, namely
the degree to which LLC statutes are uniform, whether a state has adopted
the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) or the Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA); the age of LLC
statutes; whether a state permits the formation of series LLCs; and
whether a state limits the rights of creditors of LLC members to those of
an assignee of the member's financial interest in the company.'" Finally,
California is the only state to prohibit LLCs from providing professional
services, which might explain that state's exceptionally low LLC-to-
corporations ratio.'91
The most important finding of this study is that formation fee
differentials, which are relatively small but highly visible when a business
entity is formed, explain more of the variation in LLC popularity than all
other factors combined, including all the differences in substantive law,
and the differentials in annual fees and state entity-level taxes. I hope that
future studies of individual firms will illuminate the formation choices of
closely held companies. For the time being, we must make do with the
fact that many people seem to be happy to form an LLC if an LLC costs a
few dollars less than a corporation.
189 See supra Part ll.C.
190 See supra Part .D.
191 See supra Part U1.E.
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